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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
SUITS BY INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES FOR BREACH OF COLLECTIVE BARGAIN-
ING AGREEMENTS MAY BE BROUGHT UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT.-Defendant, plaintiff's employer, had en-
tered into a collective bargaining agreement with a labor union of which
plaintiff was a member. The agreement contained no grievance arbitration
procedure, but did include a "no discrimination" clause.' Plaintiff brought
suit in a Michigan state court on behalf of himself and 49 fellow union mem-
bers for breach of the "no discrimination" clause. The complaint alleged
that defendant refused to pay plaintiff and the 49 other employees full
wages during a strike conducted by another union, even though non-union
employees were paid full wages. The state court sustained defendant's
motion to dismiss because the alleged breach indicated an unfair labor prac-
tice under the Labor Management Relations Act,' and as such, was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.! On certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States, held, reversed. A suit arising under Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, section 301 (a),' for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement provision concerning individual employee rights may be brought
by an employee against his employer in a state court, even though the
conduct sued upon is also an unfair labor practice. Smith v. Evening New
Ass'n, 83 S.Ct. 267 (1962) (Mr. Justice Black dissented on the ground
that as an unfair labor practice was involved, the jurisdiction of the state
court was pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Board').
An employee's right to sue for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the employer and the employee's union has been recognized
by state courts,6 and lower federal courts,' but in the instant case the
Supreme Court has for the first time included this right in the body of
federal labor law being formulated by the courts under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as section 301).
"'[Tihere shall be no discrimination against any employee because of his member-
ship or activity in the Guild." Instant case at 268.
2"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination in re-
gard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encouage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, § 8(a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3).
'362 Mich. 350, 106 N.W.2d 785 (1961). The Michigan court based its holding upon
a 1959 Supreme Court decision. "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or
§ 8 of the [Labor Management Relations] Act, the States as well as the federal
courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board.. ." San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1969).
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
5Mr. Justice Black also relied on San Diego Bldg. Trade8 Council v. Garmon, supra
note 3. The apparent policy of the Supreme Court to exclude suits upon collective
bargaining agreements from the operation of the Garmon rule will not be discussed
further 'in this article. For an extensive treatment of this area of labor law, see
Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HAnv. L. Rzv. 529
(1963).
'See e.g., Marvin v. Thomas J. Hoffman, Inc., 280 App. Div. 616, N.Y.S.2d 697
(1952).
'See, e.g., Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 261 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1958).
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RECENT DECISIONS
Enacted in 1947, section 301 has been the subject of considerable con-
troversy. The Supreme Court cases construing it epitomize the dynamic
state of labor law in the United States. In Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,8 the first major case concerning
section 301, the Supreme Court held that a union could not sue under
section 301 to enforce "uniquely personal rights" of individual em-
ployees.' The Court in the Westinghouse decision also stated that section
301 is procedural in nature, and therefore no substantive rights or means
of establishing a body of federal labor law could be read into that section.
The Supreme Court sought to distinguish Westinghouse in Textile Work-
ers Union v. Lincoln Mills," on the ground that Westinghouse had in-
volved an attempt to enforce "uniquely personal rights" of individual
employees, and held that section 301 is more than procedural in nature.
The Court stated that the substantive law applicable under section 301
is to be federal law fashioned by the courts pursuant to the policies of
national labor law. Since Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court has under-
taken to develop a uniform body of federal law concerning collective bar-
gaining agreements under section 301.'
The most important aspect of the instant case is the Court's rejection
of the position taken by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Westinghouse
case, that "uniquely personal rights" of employees arising out of the col-
lective bargaining agreement cannot be vindicated under section 301.'
However, before examining the desirability of allowing an employee to sue
for breach of a collective bargaining agreement under section 301, the
basis for such right must be determined.
State courts and lower federal courts have justified the right of an
employee to sue for the breach of collective bargaining agreement pro-
visions concerning purely individual rights on several theories, including
the following: that an employee is a third-party beneficiary of the agree-
ment; that the agreement is a mutual general offer, with the individual
employment contract serving as acceptance by the employee; that the prin-
ciples of agency law are applicable, with the union serving as the em-
ployee's principal; that such agreements are similar to group insurance;
and a combination of several of the above theories.' The Third Circuit in
Westinghouse,1"' by a divided court, adopted an "eclectic" theory to
describe the rights of employees under collective bargaining agreements,
concluding that agreement provisions for the employee's benefit are in-
corporated either expressly or impliedly in the individual contracts of
'348 U.S. 437 (1955).
Prior to the instant case, several lower federal courts had relied on the Westing-
kouse decision in holding that an employee could not sue for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement under section 301. See, e.g., Palnau v. Detroit Edison Co.,
801 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962). However, these courts did not question the right of an
employee to sue for breach of the agreement In state courts. Infra note 25.
1353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2In this regard, the Court has ruled that section 301 has not divested state courts of
the power to adjudicate suits on such agreements. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Court-
ney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). However, in such suits state courts must apply federal
law. -Local 1174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
"Instant case at 269.
"Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Employer, 8
LAB. L.J. 316, 319 & n.16 (1957).
"210 F,2d 623 (3rd C(ir. 1954), affd. 348 U.S. 437 (195).
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hire. Therefore, when the collective bargaining agreement promises are
solely for the employee's benefit, he alone can sue for their breach, as the
suit is based upon part of the individual hiring contract.'
The various theories under which an employee has been permitted to
enforce collective bargaining agreements by suit, and the "eclectric" rea-
soning of the Third Circuit, have arisen because of the peculiar nature
of the collective bargaining agreement. Such agreements are not employ-
ment contracts, but rather trade agreements between labor and manage-
ment.' The Supreme Court has explained these agreements in the follow-
ing words :1"
[T]he agreement may be likened to the tariffs established by a
carrier, to standard provisions prescribed by supervising author-
ities for insurance policies, or to utility schedules of rates and
rules for service, which do not of themselves establish any rela-
tionships but which do govern the terms of the shipper or insurer
or customer relationship whenever and with whomever it may be
established.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that an employee is somewhat
of a third-party beneficiary of the collective bargaining agreement,m it
does not view such agreements solely in terms of contract law for :"
[A collective bargaining agreement] is more than a contract; it
is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the drafts-
man cannot wholly anticipate. * * * It calls into being a new com-
mon law-the common law of a particular industry or of a par-
ticular plaut. * * * . . . [It] is an effort to erect a system of in-
dustrial self-government.
Thus, the collective bargaining agreement is a hybrid creature with
some characteristics of a contract, and others of regulatory legislation.
Therefore, it is clear that an employee's right to sue for breach of agree-
ment provisions concerning individual rights need not be determined
strictly on the basis of contract principles.
Professor Cox has recognized that traditional legal concepts alone
cannot be relied upon to determine the rights which arise from collective
bargaining agreements.' He contends that the union and the employer
should be free to determine, through the collective bargaining agreement,
the respective rights of the union and individual employees for purposes
of administering the agreement. However, when the intent of the union
and employer is not apparent on the face of the agreement, such intent
can be gleaned by the courts through forming presumptions based upon
'fThe Supreme Court, affirming by a divided court, rejected this reasoning of the
Circuit Court as such reasoning relies upon, ". . . an assumed federal concept of
the nature of a collective bargaining agreement which is not justified either in terms
of discoverable congressional intent or consideration relevant to the function of
the collective agreement in the field of labor relations." 348 U.S. 437, 459 (1955).
This language in turn has also been repudiated by the Court in Lieoln Mills, sra
note 9.
11J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944).17ibi4.
28 M. at 386.
"
0United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
ODCox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956) ; Cox, Individual
Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAD. L.J. 850 (1957).
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fairness and convenience.' Using this approach, Cox has formulated three
propositions :'
1. The employer and bargaining representative are free to deter-
mine by contract in the collective agreement who shall have the
right to enforce and settle claims arising out of the employer's
failure to observe the agreed conditions of employment. In other
words, the power to compromise claims, the right to sue for breach
of contract, and the necessity of exhausting a grievance procedure
shall be determined by asking what character of rights the parties
intended to create when they negotiated the agreement.
2. Unless a contrary intention is manifest, the employer's obli-
gations under a collective bargaining agreement which contains a
grievance procedure controlled by the union shall be deemed to
run solely to the union as the bargaining representative, to be
administered by the union in acordance with its fiduciary duties
to employees in the bargaining unit. The representative can en-
force the claim. It can make reasonable binding compromises.
It is liable for breaches of trust in a suit by the employee bene-
ficiaries.
3. Unless a contrary intention is manifest, a collective bargain-
ing agreement which contains no grievance procedure shall be
nCox lists five questions to be asked by the courts in determining the intent of the
union and the employer in entering the collective bargaining agreement, and the
presumptions which should result from the answers: "1. Does the contract call for
channeling all grievances and other disputes concerning its interpretation or ap-
plication into a single grievance procedure? If the union is charged with handling
grievances above the first step and if the union decides what cases to appeal and
is alone given the right to invoke arbitration this is the equivalent of stipulating
that the employees shall be paid in accordance with the contract as it is interpreted
and applied through the grievance procedure. Such a contract contemplates the
creation of rights which the union is to enforce for the benefit of the employees in
the manner of one who holds legal title to a contract claim in trust for the ultimate
beneficiaries. In such a case, the courts should rule that the union has full power
to sue and to make reasonable binding settlements. 2. Are there many clauses in
the contract which require 'implementation by the company and the union jointly or
by the company alone subject to the union's right to challenge its decisions? An
affirmative answer would point strongly to an intention to create interests legally
controlled by the union. 3. Are there many clauses in the contract whose enforce-
ment must be vested in the union because of the absence of 'injury to any identifiable
employee? 4. Is continuous law-making likely to be required in the guise of inter-
pretation because of the wide scope of the collective bargaining agreement and the
generality of its terms? 5. How often will contested claims of contract violation
give rise to competing interests among different groups of employees within the
bargaining unit which can best be resolved through the use of the union's constitu-
tional processes?" Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 8 LAB. L.J. 850, 858 (1957).
2Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REv. 601, 619 (1956). Cox's
third proposition follows the "eclectric" reasoning of the Third Circuit in the
Westinghouse decision. Under such view, the instant case could not fall under
section 301. Such reasoning compels the result that an employee can only sue on
the individual hiring contract. Therefore, his suit could not be brought under sec-
tion 301 which, by its terms, only deals with labor-management agreements. How-
ever, the better view regarding the source of employee rights seems to be that ex-
pressed by the dissent to the Third Circuit's decision In Westinghouse. That view
considered the matter of employee rights under a collective bargaining agreement
on a more realistic plane, predicating such rights on the agreement itself rather
than on the Individual hiring contract. 210 F.2d 623, 631 (3rd Cir. 1954). The
dissent relied upon the language used by the Supreme Court in the J. I. Case deci-
sion, supra note 16, and felt that the individual hiring contract is subsidiary to the
collective bargaining agreement to the extent that any suit upon an individual hir-
ing contract is also a suit upon the collective bargaining agreement itself.
19631
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deemed a bilateral contract between the employer and union
which contemplates the execution of further bilateral contracts of
employment between the employer and individual workers incor-
porating the wage scale and other conditions of employment set
forth in the collective agreement. The union may sue on the col-
lective agreement to enforce the closed shop, check-off, and similar
provisions inuring to its benefit as an organization, but only in-
dividuals may prosecute or settle claims based upon failure to ob-
serve the stipulated conditions of employment.
However, even if the above rationale as to the basis of an employee's
right to sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement is accepted,
this alone does not justify the position that such right should fall under
section 301.
The Supreme Court has stated that the substantive law to be applied
in suits under section 301 will have three definite sources: 1. Federal
labor statutes and the judicial interpretations of them; 2. Judicial in-
ventiveness in the absence of statute; and 3. state law.' The substantive
law gathered from the last two sources must be compatible with the policy
of federal labor law." Therefore, regardless of whether the right of an
employee to sue for breach of a collective bargaining agreement is a re-
sult of the common law as developed by state courts,' or results from
judicial inventiveness, before such right can fall under section 301 it must
be found to be compatible with federal labor law policy. This reasoning
is in accord with the instant case. The Court did not concern itself with
traditional legal doctrines in acknowledging the employee's right to bring
suit under section 301, but looked solely to the policy of uniformity in
federal labor law in reaching its decision.'
Aside from the fact that the instant case has added to the body of
substantive law being formulated under section 301, the Court has also
indicated that it has not departed from its policy of requiring a strict
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under section 301.
Prior to Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,' the Supreme Court had been
quite liberal in determining the substantive rights of both management
and labor arising under section 301.' The Court in Sinclair ruled in a
five-three decision that the Norris-LaGuardia Act' continued to prevent
federal courts from enjoining strikes, even though the strikes in question
2Supra note 10 at 457.
2mIbid.
It would appear that the right of the employee to sue for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement is recognized as a development of the common law. "There
was no suggestion that Congress, at a time when its attention was directed to con-
gestion in the federal courts, . . .intended to open the doors of the federal courts
to a potential flood of grievances based upon an employer's failure to comply with
terms of a collective agreement relating to compensation, terms peculiar in the in-
dividual benefit which is their subject matter and which, when violated, give a
cause of action to the individual employee. The employee's have always been able
to enforce their individual rights in the state courts... To this extent, the col-
lective bargaining contract has always been "enforceable." Supra note 8 at 460.
"Instant case at 270.
1"370 U.S. 195 (1962).
"United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ; UnIted
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
'29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115,
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were alleged to be in violation of a collective bargaining agreement, "no
strike" clause. The Court reasoned that the Norris-LaGuardia anti-
injunction provision governs all strikes, regardless of whether or not
they also constitute a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.' Mr.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices' Douglas and Harlan, dissented on
the ground that section 301 and Norris-LaGuardia could be "accommo-
dated" in order to preserve the purpose of each in the same manner as
Norris-LaGuardia and the Railway Labor Act had been in Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen v. Cvicago River & Indiana R.R. Co.' The dis-
sent argued that such "accommodation" is necessary for the effective en-
forcement of arbitration provisions contained in collective bargaining agree-
ments.
The position taken by the majority in Sinclair, as contrasted with the
reasoning of the dissent, is reminiscent of the question posed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the Westinghouse decision. "How far are courts to go in
reshaping or transforming the obvious design of Congress in order to
achieve validity for something Congress has not fashioned?"' Thus, the
Sinclair decision may be some indication that the Court has begun a re-
treat from the liberality it has heretofore demonstrated in determining the
substantive rights arising under section 301. In short, the Court may be
partially abandoning its position that, "the basic policy of national labor
legislation [is] to promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic
warfare. '
The instant case is the first decision of the Court concerning section
301 since Sinclair, and it gives some indication that the Court will not
further weaken its policy that under section 301 both labor and manage-
ment must comply with the terms of the agreements they have voluntarily
entered into.
The agreement in the instant case contained no grievance arbitration
procedure, and thus the question remains open whether the Supreme Court
in future applicable cases will adopt the approach suggested by Cox's second
proposition, i.e., that the inclusion of such procedure precludes individual
employee suits. A footnote to the majority opinion in the instant case sug-
gests that grievance arbitration procedure in collective bargaining agree-
ments will have to be exhausted before the Court will allow an employee to
sue under section 301.' However, the footnote gives no indication whether
an employee will have recourse against his employer after exhausting the
tm"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in con-
cert, any of the following acts: (a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to
remain in any relation of employment; . . . (e) Giving publicity to the existence
of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence; ... (i) Advis-
ing, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or violence the acts
heretofore specified .... 29 U.S.C. § 104.8370 U.S. 195, 202 (1962).
f353 U.S. 30 (1957).
0348 U.S. 437, 454 (1955).
"369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
"Instant case at 268.
19631
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 24 [1962], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/7
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
grievance procedure, or will only be able to sue his union upon a breach of
trust theory.M
It is submitted that if an employee is allowed to sue his employer under
section 301 after exhausting the collective bargaining agreement grievance
arbitration procedure, there will be further encroachment upon the policy
of industrial peace through arbitration. Such a suit would deny the em-
ployer the benefit of the union's promise to act as a representative of its
members. It would thus weaken the arbitration procedure by virtue of the
employer's knowledge that he may ultimately be subject to suit by the
employee, even though a compromise as to the empolyee's grievance is
reached with the union.
On the other hand, if the union refuses to arbitrate the employee's
claim, or the employee is dissatisfied with the compromise made by the
union with the employer, the policy of industrial peace through arbitra-
tion would be fully served by allowing the employee to sue his union for
breach of trust under section 301.' This would assure the employer that
his compromise with the union would be binding so far as a suit by the
employee is concerned, and place the burden on the union to defend its
method of representing the particular employee.
However, the Court in the instant case, by way of a footnote, refused
to consider plaintiff's substantive right to sue for breach of the "no dis-
crimination" clause, or the right of any employee to sue for breach of any
collective bargaining agreement provision concerning individual employee
rights.' This refusal in effect rejects the notion that, but virtue of the
Sinclair decision, the Court will accept limitations on section 301 which
will hinder the effective operation of collective bargaining agreements. If
the Court had unqualifiedly determined that an employee could sue his
employer under section 301 to enforce individual rights arising out of any
collective bargaining agreement, then grievance arbitration provisions would
be of little value. For these reasons, it seems likely that the Court will limit
the right of the individual employee to sue his employer, under section 301,
to those cases in which the collective bargaining agreement contains no
grievance arbitration procedure.
The Supreme Court in the instant case has made a valuable addition
to the uniform law governing labor-management agreements by allowing an
TFalsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960).
nIt would not be difficult for the Court to find that the fiduciary duty of the union
to represent the employee in the grievance arbitration procedure arises out of the
collective bargaining agreement. "In entering into this [collective bargaining]
Agreement, the Union has assumed the role of trustee for the rights of its members
and other employees in the bargaining unit. The employees, on the other hand, have
become beneficiaries of the fiduciary obligations owed by the Union. . . If the
Union, in processing an employee's grievance, does not act in good faith, in a reason-
able manner and without fraud, it becomes liable in damages for breach of duty.
In th'is way, the employee is recompensed for the harm he had suffered, and yet the
process of collective bargaining in the industry is meaningfully preserved." Id. at
161 A.2d 895.
T'Instant case at 270. Mr. Justice Black in dissenting could see no reason for the
Court's refusal to determine these rights, but he did not disagree with the Court as
to the rights of employees under section 301. Instant case at 272. In dissenting in
the Westinghouse decision, Mr. Justice Black also emphasized that the rights of the
individual employee are enforceable under section 301. 348 U.S. 437, 465 (1955).
[Vol. 24,
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employee to sue his employer under section 301 when the collective bar-
gaining agreement contains no grievance arbitration procedure. Further-
more, by impliedly refusing to determine the right of an employee to sue
his employer under section 301 for breach of an agreement containing
grievance arbitration procedure, the Court has indicated that it has not
abandoned its view that industrial peace is best obtained by the enforce-
ment of collective bargaining agreements.
KEMP J. WILSON
TAXPAYER WHO GENERATES INCOME AND DESIGNATES ITS RECIPIENT
HELD NOT TAXABLE THEREON WHEN HE HAS No RIGHT TO RECEIVE IT.-
Taxpayer entered a contest under rules which required contestants over the
age of seventeen years and one month to designate persons under that age
as recipients of any prizes won. Taxpayer, an adult, designated his daugh-
ter and his entry subsequently won. The daughter received an annuity
policy payable to her at age eighteen without restriction as to the use of
the proceeds. Taxpayer did not include the amount of the prize in his in-
come tax return and the Commissioner determined a deficiency for the
amount excluded. The United States Tax Court held that a taxpayer who
generates income and designates its recipient is not taxable thereon when
he has no right to receive it. Tesckner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C -......no  101
(1962) (two justices concurring) (seven justices dissenting).
Prior to 1954 the courts expressed divergent views as to who should
be taxed on prizes and awards.' With the enactment of section 74 of the
1954 Internal Revenue Code "amounts received as prizes and awards" were
expressly included in the gross income of the recipient.' In the instant case
the question before the court was whether a taxpayer who entered a con-
test and won a prize could be taxed upon it even though, under the rules
of the contest, he could not receive the prize.'
'Compare Pauline C. Washburn, 5 T.C. 1333 (1945) ("Pot 0' Gold" case) ; McDer-
mott v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Ross Essay contest) ; Glenn v. Bates,
217 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 19 5 4 )'(car giveaway) ; with Herbert Stein, 14 T.C. 494 (1950)
and Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711 (1952).
2INT. REv. CODE, § 74: Prizes and Awards.
"(a) General Rule.-Except as provided in subsection (b) and in section 117
(relating to scholarships and fellowship grants), gross income includes amounts re-
ceived as prizes and awards.
"(b) Exception.-Gross income does not include amounts received as prizes and
awards made primarily in recognition of religious, charitable, scientific, educational,
artistic, literary, or civic achievement, but only if-
"(1) the recipient was selected without any action on his part to enter
the contest *or proceeding; and
"(2) the recipient is not required to render substantial future services as a
condition to receiving the prize or award."
There was no question in the instant case as to whether the prize constituted tax-
able income. The sole question was whether taxpayer should be taxed upon it. In-
stant case at 3. Under section 74 of the INT. Rzv. CODE the recipient of the prize
is taxed. From the facts in the instant case it would seem that the daughter should
be taxed. Instant case at 7. See infra note 33.
1963]
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 24 [1962], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol24/iss2/7
